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Abstract—This paper presents a view of the Danish FlexPower 
project to reform the existing electricity market by coordinating 
vast Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) for integration in 
future scenarios. Aiming to maximize the preservation of the 
existing market structure, Aggregator, the key player in 
mobilizing small-scale DERs to participate in the existing 
electricity market, is proposed in this paper to cope with the 
day-ahead, intra-day and regulating power market. Possible 
future organizations of different time-scale markets are also 
introduced and discussed with the precise roles and 
responsibilities of Aggregator. It is seen that the most 
appropriate function for Aggregator’s capabilities is to cluster 
DERs as an expended ancillary service. In addition, the 
interactions with current market actors are introduced in detail. 
Index Terms-- electricity market; DERs; Aggregator; ancillary 
service 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Over the last decade, the Danish government has 
conducted policies to provide incentives for the development 
of renewable energy technologies. Among these technologies, 
wind power has become the focus for a large amount of 
research and innovation. At the end of 2012, energy from 
wind power had already met 30% of Danish annual electricity 
consumption [1]. Moreover, Government policy has targeted a 
30% wind power share of total energy consumption and 50% 
of electricity consumption by 2025 [2]. Denmark is on its way 
to extricating itself from traditional energy consumption and 
to releasing its dependence on fossil fuels by 2050 [3][4]. 
Considering the increasing penetration of renewable 
energy sources into existing and future electricity market 
structures, there is a great challenge for system operators in 
maintaining system security and reliability. The stochastic and 
fluctuant nature of wind power requires a sufficient regulating 
power operation to ensure system balance between electricity 
production and consumption. To avoid unnecessary 
overburden of interconnection cables which import regulating 
power when needed in Denmark, DERs are put forward as a 
new type of regulating power source which is planned to 
generate electricity from small-scale renewable power 
generation or to change electricity portfolios in consumption 
[5]. 
The arising conflicts between DERs and outdated market 
structures are the most essential reason for improving the 
existing market structure so as to adapt to the new electricity 
industry environment and to promote a more efficient and 
effective power system. In particular, these conflicts include: 
a) Only Central Generation (CG) is taken into consideration in 
the design of electricity market structures, and the incentives 
from DERs are not considered comprehensively. b) Existing 
market rules restrict small-scale energy generation to power 
existing electricity markets. Therefore, the flexibility of DERs 
cannot be fully and effectively utilized to benefit the power 
system operation with high penetration of renewable energy 
resources.  
This paper will put DER incentives as the first priority 
when designing new market structures. Along with the new 
market actor, Aggregator, DERs will have a positive effect on 
maintaining system balance. However, they also need to be 
provided proper incentives to participate in various time-scale 
electricity markets. This paper intends to utilize all the 
advantages of Aggregator-based small scale DERs with 
minimal changes to the existing market structure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
provides some basic background information: introduction of 
existing electricity market, capability and economic benefits 
of DERs, functions of one-way price signals, and Aggregator 
entering into the operation of power systems. Section 3 
analyzes types of possible future electricity market and 
ancillary service market in Denmark plus designs the 
interplays of each market in future organization. Finally, in 
section 4 conclusions and recommendations are drawn up. 
II. MOTIVATION AND FEASIBILITY 
A.  Existing Market 
In the Nordic countries, the electricity trading market is 
Nord Pool Spot, in which the Day-ahead market and intra-day 
market are the two major market places for trading electricity. 
before operation: (1) The Day-ahead market trades electricity 
by auction and closes one day before operation and (2) the 
This work was supported by the Danish PSO smart grid project – 
FlexPower. 
intra-day market trades electricity in the form of bilateral 
contracts and closes one-hour before operation [6]. 
Within the operating time, the Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) maintains and restores system balance 
between production and consumption through power bought 
previously in the reserve capacity market by automatically 
controlled reserve devices. Moreover, the regulating power 
market is under the operation of the TSO by activating bids 
for the manual reserve that was traded previously in the 
reserve capacity market, or any other bids for voluntary 
regulating power. Moreover, other reserve capacity works 
automatically in response to frequency deviations so as to 
conduct regulation at an earlier time than the manual reserve 
[7].  
B. Economic Benefit of DERs  
DERs may refer to a few types of generation that are 
plausible for providing flexible energy for the power system. 
Typical examples of these generations include Wind Turbines, 
Electric Vehicles (EV), Heat Pumps and Solar Cells, etc. [8]. 
With the growing share of DERs in total electricity 
production, DERs’ contribution in grid stability and 
operational security will keep increasing through substituting 
part of the power from CGs. Compared with CGs, DERs may 
have advantages in quick response as well as short-distance 
electricity supply to end-users because of its flexibility due to 
small scale.  
DERs’ potential ability to provide certain ancillary 
services has been the focus of much literature, for example 
[9]. Principally, DERs are capable of providing any ancillary 
services, provided the DERs can meet the output requirement 
of the ancillary service. 
The cost of DERs’ generation is another essential concern 
in determining whether or not to select DERs as a reserve 
provider to CGs. In fact, DERs are relatively cheap, with 
lower installation costs and apparently lower variable costs 
than CGs. Lower variable costs mean a low incremental cost 
of each kWh electricity. Hence, electricity from DERs has a 
high price advantage in providing energy as well as reserve 
capacity. 
C. One-way price signal 
With the help of advanced information and control 
technology, it is possible to utilize the flexibility of DERs to 
provide regulating power in regulation market through 
receiving and reacting price signals. The main idea of this 
price-based signal control method is introduced in [12]. This 
concept focuses on a one-way price signal method, which is a 
supplement of the current regulating power market.  
D. Aggregator 
Generally, the Balance Responsible Party (BRP) has a 
duty to register and report all generation data. With the entry 
bidding requirement of BRPs, the arising DERs cannot be 
directly connected with BRPs in existing market 
organizations. To overcome this, a new market actor, 
Aggregator, is proposed and designed to mobilize these DERs 
in order to satisfy the capacity limit of entering the market. 
Moreover, in the FlexPower project [13], a mathematic model 
is formulated to simulate the response of these individuals 
when Aggregator is applied. The literature [13] also proves 
that it is more accurate to predict total output and input with 
the application of Aggregators, than to predict individual 
output and input. This means that forecasting the aggregated 
output of DERs or even consumption of flexible consumers, is 
reasonable and feasible in principle. This justifies the 
implementation of Aggregators as a potential therapy. 
Moreover, with the integration of EVs and other electric 
devices in the future, end-users can change their consumption 
profiles accordingly. Therefore it is more challenging to 
predict hourly electricity profiles for Aggregators than for 
current normal retailers. In construction, it is the price signal 
that provides incentive for DERs to adjust electricity profiles. 
This means Aggregators should possess the ability to tackle 
the complex relation between price and predicted electricity 
profiles through historical data and weather forecasting 
information.  
Based on this idea, BRPs are still responsible for 
registering and trading in market activities. However 
Aggregators are applied to cluster DERs and forecast total 
consumption or generation by them, and then consolidate data 
and forward them to BRPs. In the new organization, 
Aggregators are selected as commercial agents. Through 
active promotion of business deals, Aggregators engage in 
DERs and act as agencies between them and BRPs. 
III. FUTURE ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN 
Considering the Danish electricity market is a part of the 
Nordic electricity market, which consists mainly of day-ahead 
market, intra-day market, reserve capacity market (ancillary 
service market) and regulating power market corresponding to 
different time spans. To illustrate the market organization 
design, this section is divided into two parts; electricity energy 
market and reserve capacity market. 
A. Future Electricity Market 
With the development of DERs, the current market 
organization may become less efficient and effective. 
Therefore, potential improvement of the market organization 
in future is analyzed in this section. Moreover, a possible 
market structure, roles and responsibilities of market actors as 
well as their interactions in the future market are characterized 
in detail. 
1) Day-ahead Market 
In addition to CGs and retailers, new market participants 
and DERs are planning to enter the operation of power system 
[14]. In order to provide proper incentives for them to trade 
their energy in the day-ahead market, market organization 
should be updated. One thing that should be noted is that 
DERs are normally limited in capacity; therefore they cannot 
participate in the day-ahead market directly. Furthermore, they 
do not have the full ability to estimate their individual 
electricity input or output accurately [8], so they cannot join 
BRPs for trading in the day-ahead market, either. In this case, 
Aggregators are applied which justify the redesign of market 
organization. 
In Figure 1, the same as the existing day-ahead market, the 
TSO is responsible for supervising and facilitating market 
activities, and there are several BRPs trading in this market 
[15]. In detail, BRPs forecast total generated volume and 
corresponding cost of their generation, as well as the total 
consumed volume demanded and corresponding price offered 
by their retailers in an individual hour of an operation day 
through information exchanging with retailers and CGs [6].  
In this organization design, the day-ahead electricity 
market has more commercial actors, including retailers, CGs 
and also Aggregators, as shown in Figure 1. These 
commercial actors are allowed to share one common BRP. 
Aggregators, retailers and CGs forecast their consumption or 
production and send their schedules to their BRPs. 
Specifically, the new market actors - the Aggregators - 










Supervising and Facilitating 
Market Activities







Figure 1 Interplay of market actors in the future day-ahead market 
According to reported forecasts, BRPs calculate an energy 
volume that they will sell or purchase in the electricity market, 
and then send hourly bids or offers to the Nord Pool Spot day-
ahead market before it closes. After Nord Pool Spot 
announces the spot price and bid volume of each BRP for each 
hour of an operation day, according to the volume it has been 
bid for, the BRP sends a generation plan to its CGs and 
Aggregators of DERs. At the same time, the BRP also sends a 
consumption plan to retailers and Aggregators of flexible 
consumers. Finally, the Aggregator can send hourly 
consumption price signals to DERs. One thing that must be 
noted here is that the generation price or consumption price of 
the same Aggregator may be different, even if they have the 
same energy spot price, because different electricity tariffs are 
added for electricity generation or consumption. 
As shown in Figure 1, BRPs trade electricity in the day-
ahead market for their CGs, retailers and even Aggregators. 
They are responsible for payments and income transfers. They 
are also responsible for the costs due to deviations of bids and 
offers in actual production and consumption taking place 
during operation. 
2) Intra-day Market 
The development and future existence of DERs in the 
electricity market also necessitates that Aggregators 
participate in the intra-day market so as to allow small-scale 
generators or consumers to have access to the intra-day market 
to trade the deviation of forecasted consumption or generation. 
The role of Aggregators is similar to that in the day-ahead 
market. Actually, the introduction of Aggregators into the 
intra-day market is a supplementary idea of the introduction of 
them into the day-ahead market.  
After the day-ahead market closes, and one hour before of 
operation hour, BRPs may encounter unforeseeable changes in 
demand and generation through information exchange with 
retailers and CGs, as shown in Figure 2. Like other 
commercial actors, to maximally avoid costs from imbalanced 
clearing, Aggregators need to participate in the intra-day 
market in case deviations of estimations of their DERs happen 
one hour before operating time. These participations require 
BRPs acting as middle agencies. The TSO is still responsible 
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Figure 2 Interplay of market actors in current intra-day market 
As shown in Figure 2, BRPs trade their deviations of 
scheduled consumption or generation in the intra-day market. 
As with the existing market, there are two kinds of trading in 
the intra-day market: (1) a BRP can send a request with 
passive or negative volume and a hidden price for a specific 
duration of the operation day to market, and then other BRPs 
can bid for it. The first BRP providing a satisfactory price will 
get the bid; and (2) a BRP can also directly conduct a bilateral 
trade with another BRP without any market activity [6]. 
Moreover, BRPs are responsible for payment and income 
transfers. They are also responsible for the costs due to 
imbalances in actual production and consumption during 
operation. 
3) Regulating Power Market 
With the development of renewable energy in Denmark, 
together with the policy of eliminating traditional generation, 
there will be an increasing demand for regulating power. Since 
in the case of Denmark it is the import from CGs of 
neighboring countries that fills the gap between requested 
regulating power and domestically generated regulating power 
[5], the burden on interconnection cables will inevitably 
increase. To minimize dependence on other countries and also 
to maintain a stable power system operation, developing own 
regulating power in Denmark is the most essential motivation 
of DERs. This in return requires an update of the organization 
of regulating power market so as to provide accessibility and 
incentive for DERs to join.  
From the perspective of the TSO, with more fluctuating 
renewable energy generations being connected, the electricity 
produced by DERs will become an important source of 
regulating energy in the new market organization. Certainly 
the TSO will benefit from the flexible production of DERs 
when regulating energy is scarce in market. In regulating 
market when regulating power is required, the TSO directly 
cooperates with Aggregators who can directly communicate 
with DERs. Finally, the TSO should also be responsible for 
the updates of the electricity market design in response to 
changes in market development.  
Generally, all electricity trading transactions should pass 
through BRPs, and all regulating power bids sent into various 
electricity markets are conducted by BRPs. However, since in 
Denmark the bidding size of regulating power is between 10 
MW and 50 MW [5], it is not practical for DERs to join the 
regulating power market directly. Aggregators are also useful 
in this market. Aggregators are allowed to bid in regulating 
power market and act as a potential client for TSOs via BRPs. 
As illustrated in [13], forecasting collected generation of 
DERs and consumption of flexible consumers with relevance 
to price is reasonable and feasible in principle. Hence, in 
future, Aggregators should be developed to have the 
responsibility to bill and send various incentive signals, such 
as price, to DERs. Through these signals, Aggregators can 
manipulate the consumption or production profile when the 
TSO requires regulating power. Under the command of the 
TSO, Aggregators can also cooperate in tackling the issue of 
energy imbalance. Moreover, the most important point is such 
that with the introduction of Aggregators, advantages of DERs 
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Figure 3 Interplay of market actors in future regulating power market 
Like the traditional regulating power market, by regulating 
the power market as well as other markets for automatic 
reserves, the TSO maintains the balance of electricity 
production and consumption. The TSO implements up- or 
down- regulation of electricity generation or consumption by 
purchasing reserves power. Among all reserves, only the 
manual reserve needs to be activated by the TSO in regulating 
power market. BRPs reserved in the manual reserve market 
have the responsibility to send bids to the regulating power 
market, but other BRPs can also send voluntary bids. As 
shown in Figure 3, BRPs send bids with offered capacity and 
the price of the activating power to the regulating power 
market (Nordic Operation Information System). The TSO 
manages the activation of regulating power, and directly sends 
control signals to the CGs of accepted bids, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
In this designed organization, Aggregators are applied to 
assemble DERs to join a BRP. If DERs under Aggregators 
want to join the regulating power market, they must be able to 
be fully activated within 15 minutes. In the regulating power 
market, the main task of Aggregators is to supply a promised 
regulating power to BRPs, and to be activated if the TSO 
requires regulating power to balance electricity during 
operation. In Figure 3, an activation order started from the 
TSO can be directly transmitted to power suppliers, 
Aggregators or CGs. Alternatively, it also can be transmitted 
to BRPs and then forwarded to Aggregators, as shown by 
arrows “Activating Regulating Power 2”. 
BRPs sell regulating power to the TSO in the regulating 
power market, so they are responsible for payment and income 
transfers and then Aggregators and CGs receive benefits from 
the BRPs, as shown in Figure 3. Costs associated with 
activating regulating power will be passed to those BRPs who 
feature imbalance [7]. 
B. Future Ancillary Service Market 
Given DERs entering into electricity system, the newly 
designed organization should hit the following targets: 1) Aim 
at efficiently utilizing the flexibility of DERs to provide 
ancillary services for contributing to system balance. 2) 
Previously introduced Aggregators in future energy market 
will be extended to apply in the reserve capacity market, so as 
to have a larger capacity in bids by aggregating DERs.  
The TSO purchases reserve capacity, either of 
consumption or of generation (measured in MW), to ensure 
there are sufficient DERs working to balance the electricity 
market. If DERs can fulfill the requirement for various 
reserves in response time, they can also provide these reserves 
with the help of Aggregators.  
Whenever CGs or Aggregators provide the primary 
reserve, secondary reserve, and manual reserve, their BRPs 
are responsible for sending bids to the reserve capacity market 
before different reserve capacity markets are closed, as shown 
in Figure 4. Moreover, these generations must be approved in 
advance by the TSO to ensure that they have the qualification 
to provide reserve capacity service. After the markets have 
closed, the TSO announces the accepted bids and agreed price 
as shown in Figure 4. Then, according to the agreed price, the 
TSO releases payment to the BRPs. 
Various reserves differ in control relation. According to 
[7], the primary reserve is activated by control equipment in 
response to grid frequency deviation; the secondary reserve is 
activated by a control signal from the TSO through the BRPs, 
which are also subject to frequency deviation; finally, manual 











































Figure 4 Interplay of market actors in future reserve capacity market 
BRPs trade reserve capacity in the electricity market. They 
are responsible for payments and incomes transfers with the 
TSO. There is only an availability payment, but no energy 
payment of the primary reserve. The secondary reserve and 
manual reserve have both an availability payment and energy 
payment [7]. 
IV. Conclusion 
The most satisfactory features of this proposed 
organization are such that with the introduction of new actors, 
i.e. Aggregators, (1) only slight changes are enough for market 
operation; (2) Aggregators are compatible with other 
commercial actors in operation and (3) Aggregators can 
provide the most efficient incentive for DER owners to join 
the energy market. In addition, the concept of Aggregator 
proposed in this paper is highly theoretical. In practice, it is 
critical to understand who is acting as the Aggregator. Hence, 
the organization could be improved in future if it is known 
who the Aggregator is. Moreover, in response to this, 
incentive schemes for the underlying organizations should 
take this into consideration and result in a much more complex 
market organization.  
This paper analyzes the inefficiency of the existing market 
organization considering the introduction of DERs, and 
proposes a potential future organization and interactions with 
the electricity market in which the Aggregator arises to collect 
the DERs so as to have access to BRPs. The proposed 
organization and interaction can release the burden on BRPs 
in coping with the large amount of DERs. Moreover, in 
response to the ability of DERs to provide ancillary services, 
this report also provides a detail analysis of existing and 
proposed future organization and interaction of market actors 
in the ancillary service market. With this proposed 
organization and interaction of the electricity market, stable 
operation and development of the electricity market in the 
future can be ensured. 
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